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Treating People With Information: an Analysis and 
Review of Approaches to Communicating Health Risk Information
Alexander J. Rothman* and Marc T. Kiviniemi
Department of Psychology
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis
Th e communication of risk information is a fundamental aspect of 
nearly all health promotion interventions. How ever, no consensus ex-
ists regarding the most eff ective way to provide people with risk infor-
mation. We will review and evaluate the relative merits of two ap-
proaches to risk com munication. One approach relies on the presentation 
of nu merical information regarding the probability of a health problem 
occurring, whereas the other relies on the presen tation of information 
about the antecedents and conse quences of a health problem. Because 
people have consider able diffi  culty understanding and using quantita-
tive information, the eff ectiveness of interventions that rely solely on 
numerical probability information has been limited. In terventions that 
provide people with a broader informa tional context in which to think 
about a health problem have had greater success systematically infl uenc-
ing perceptions of personal risk but have several important limitations. 
How ever, before any fi nal conclusions can be drawn regarding the rel-
ative merits of diff erent communication strategies, in vestigators must 
agree on the specifi c criteria that should be used to identify an eff ective 
intervention. [Monogr Natl Can cer Inst 1999;25:44-51]
Because of the infl uence that perceptions of personal risk are 
thought to have on people’s health practices (1,2), the commu-
nication of health risk information has become a prominent part 
of health prevention eff orts. People are frequently provided with 
numerical information about the probability that a specifi c pat tern 
of behavior (e.g., smoking) will lead to a particular health problem 
(e.g., lung cancer). Although the dissemination of this information 
has increased public awareness of potential health problems, its ef-
fect on perceptions of personal risk for these problems has been 
less dramatic (3).
Why has this information had such a limited eff ect on peo ple’s 
beliefs about their own personal vulnerability? A possible explana-
tion is that people routinely misunderstand numerical information 
about the probability that an outcome will occur (4). Th is confu-
sion leads people to misinterpret the implications of the informa-
tion and, thus, undermines any systematic eff ect it might other-
wise have on their beliefs and behavior. Moreover, people are not 
passive, unbiased processors of information about their health sta-
tus (5). Th ey welcome favorable information about their health 
but often engage in strategies that minimize or discount unfavor-
able health information—strategies that, in turn, blunt any infl u-
ence this information might have on decision making and behav-
ior [e.g., (6-8)].
In light of these cognitive and motivational barriers, what is the 
best way to communicate health risk information so that people 
both understand it and recognize its implications for their own 
risk status? We will examine several methods that have been used 
to communicate health risk information and evaluate their eff ect 
on perceptions of personal risk. Our goal is to iden tify conditions 
that maximize the desired impact of health risk information on 
people’s health beliefs. Th e degree to which risk-based interven-
tions aff ect people’s behavioral practices is reviewed elsewhere in 
this volume (see Gerrard et al. [this monograph] and McCaul and 
Tulloch [this monograph]).
Before reviewing the merits of diff erent approaches to risk com-
munication, we consider two issues that are fundamental to any 
assessment of risk communication strategies. First, how do peo-
ple think about and form judgments of health risks? Inter ventions 
designed to help people assess their risk will be suc cessful only 
if consideration is given to how people process diff erent types of 
health risk information. Second, what is the most appropriate way 
to assess the impact of a health risk in tervention? An intervention 
could infl uence knowledge about a risk factor, beliefs about per-
sonal risk, perceptions of how one’s own risk compares with the 
average person’s risk, or intentions to act to reduce one’s risk. Be-
cause these diff erent measures can provide quite diff erent impres-
sions of people’s beliefs, the spe cifi c set of criteria an investigator 
chooses to rely on can aff ect whether or not a particular interven-
tion is perceived to be eff ec tive (3,9).
How Do People Think About Health Risks?
People are quite willing to provide estimates of personal health 
risks, but what these estimates reveal about their health beliefs is 
unclear. Although risk estimates are typically inter preted as the 
probability with which people believe a health problem will oc-
cur, there is considerable evidence that they refl ect a broader set 
of cognitive and aff ective beliefs. Analyses of how people interpret 
and compare health risks have consis tently revealed that lay per-
ceptions of risk are not simply a function of probability informa-
tion but rather are aff ected by the beliefs people hold about both 
the antecedents of the problem (for example: “Is it voluntary?” “Is 
it controllable?”) and its consequences [for example: “Can it be de-
tected?” “Would it be catastrophic?”; see (10,11)].
Why might people’s perceptions of risk be aff ected by infor-
mation about the antecedents and consequences of a health prob-
lem? First of all, people think about health problems in relation 
to their causes and consequences and, in fact, health informa-
tion is organized in memory primarily around these two classes of
information (12). Moreover, some investigators have proposed that 
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mentally simulate or imagine themselves experiencing the prob-
lem (13,14). Th us, information will aff ect judgments of risk to the 
extent that it enables one to imagine that “it could happen to me.” 
In the context of this framework, knowledge of both the anteced-
ents and the consequences of a health problem has clear informa-
tional value.
Antecedent information helps people think about how a health 
problem could develop. It renders salient the specifi c factors that 
either promote or prevent the development of a health problem 
[e.g., (15)]. Moreover, it helps people recognize the links be-
tween the very things that they do—or do not do— and unwant-
ed health outcomes [e.g., (16)]. Whereas information about the 
antecedents of a health problem underscores how people can alter 
their chances of developing a health problem, information about 
consequences emphasizes what it would be like to actually have 
the health problem. Vivid information about the consequences of 
the health problem helps people to recog nize the severity of what 
could happen to them [e.g., (17,18)] and, moreover, that it actu-
ally has happened to people just like them [e.g., (19)]. Th us, both 
types of information provide useful and nonoverlapping material 
to help individuals assess and in terpret their risk.
Even though numerical probability information provides peo-
ple with a precise description of their risk, its informational value 
is unclear. In and of itself, providing people with numeri cal prob-
ability information about a health problem (for example:
“You have a one in 500 chance of developing breast cancer”) is 
likely to have little eff ect on their ability to imagine either what 
might happen to them or how it might occur. In fact, research 
has shown that people tend to underutilize probability informa-
tion except when it provides explicit causal information about 
how a particular event will occur (20,21). Given that particu-
lar types of information about a health problem may have great-
er informa tional value than others, any evaluation of health risk 
commu nications must consider the characteristics of the specif-
ic infor mation provided. In particular, messages that exclusive-
ly provide people with numerical probability information need 
to be diff erentiated from those that provide people with more 
gen eral information about the antecedents or consequences of a 
health problem.
Evaluating Th e Impact of Health Risk 
Information
How does one determine whether a health risk message has 
been eff ective? Investigators have assessed people’s knowledge of 
the specifi c risks posed by a behavior (for example: “How does 
smoking aff ect people’s risk for lung cancer?”), beliefs about the 
absolute magnitude of their own risk (for example:
“Given your current smoking habit, what is your risk for devel-
oping lung cancer?”), and beliefs about how their risk compares 
with that of a specifi ed comparison group (for example: “How 
does your risk for developing lung cancer compare with that of the 
typical smoker?”).
Evidence that people are aware of the risks posed by a par ticular 
pattern of behavior may indicate the successful commu nication of 
health risk information, but it cannot tell us whether people rec-
ognize the risk as personally relevant. Direct measures of person-
al risk are needed to answer this question. However, it is not clear 
whether the criterion for an eff ective intervention should be based 
on changing absolute levels of personal risk or in modifying com-
parative risk. Numerous studies have revealed that people report 
their own risk of experiencing a health prob lem to be less than 
that of the average person and that this occurs even when they are 
given information about the average per son’s risk or behavior [e.g., 
(22,23)]. Th is optimistic bias has been taken to indicate that peo-
ple systematically underestimate important personal health risks 
and, thus, considered a barrier to the adoption of precautionary 
behaviors [(24); but see (13)]. However, the absence of any empiri-
cal evidence that people’s behavioral decisions are related diff er-
entially to perceptions of absolute and comparative risk limits any 
conclusion that can be drawn as to which measure off ers the most 
informative assess ment of people’s beliefs.
Different Approaches to Communicating 
Health Risk Information
We now turn to a brief review of the literature on commu-
nicating health risk information. Th e review covers studies that 
have systematically compared diff erent methods of communi cating 
risk information, all of which were developed to aff ect people’s be-
liefs about health risks that were associated with either their own 
behavior (e.g., smoking or sexual behavior) or their environment 
(e.g., radon). None of the studies included in this review addressed 
the communication of risks posed by diff erent medical treatments.
We distinguish between two general approaches to commu-
nicating health risk information: a numerical probability-based 
approach and a contextualized approach. A probability-based ap-
proach focuses on the presentation of numerical information re-
garding the probability of a given risk occurring. Th e primary goal 
of studies that have utilized this approach has been to identify the 
most eff ective way to communicate risk informa tion. Specifi cally, 
these studies seek to determine how diff erent presentation formats 
aff ect people’s ability to understand and, in some cases, use the nu-
merical information provided. Th ese in terventions have ranged 
from the straightforward communica tion of a numerical prob-
ability (for example: “You have a one in 500 chance of develop-
ing cancer in the next 10 years”) to pre sentation formats designed 
to heighten the salience or impact of the statistical information. 
Some of the more innovative presen tation strategies have involved 
framing the information in terms of how frequently someone will 
die in a community as a result of a given risk (25) or presenting 
risk information in such a way that it can be compared with the 
magnitude of other risks (26).
A second approach to risk communication has focused on pro-
viding people with an informational context in which to un derstand 
and interpret their risk. Th e defi ning feature of a con textualized 
approach is that it provides people with information about the an-
tecedents and/or the consequences of a potential health problem. 
A variety of intervention methods can be con sidered contextual. 
Some interventions have emphasized the an tecedents of a health 
problem by providing people with specifi c information regarding 
the link between a health problem and their own prior behavior or 
medical history [e.g., (16)]. Other interventions have used testi-
monials from people who have ex perienced the health problem to 
convey information about how the problem developed and/or how 
it has aff ected their lives [e.g., (19,27,28)]. Other contextualized 
interventions have focused on providing people with information
or images that ren der the negative consequences of the health risk 
salient and vivid [e.g., (29,30)]. In almost every case, the prima-
ry goal of the intervention has been to increase people’s recog-
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nition of the risk posed by their behavior or environment. Th us, 
these interven tions have been developed not only to communi-
cate risk infor mation, but also to do it in as persuasive a manner 
as possible.
Th ere are several criteria that an investigator can use to de-
termine the eff ectiveness of any given communication strategy. 
First, an eff ective strategy might lead people to be better in formed 
about the likelihood of a health problem. Interventions that em-
phasize the presentation of probability information have focused 
primarily on this criterion. Alternatively, an eff ective strategy could 
appropriately alter people’s perceptions of per sonal or comparative 
risk. Th ird, an eff ective strategy could be one that heightens peo-
ple’s interest in relevant primary preven tion behaviors, indepen-
dent of changes in risk perceptions. Em pirical tests of contextually 
based interventions have focused primarily on the latter two crite-
ria. Whenever possible, we report the eff ect an intervention meth-
od has had on both absolute and comparative measures of risk as 
well as whether changes in risk perceptions were associated with 
changes in other risk-relevant beliefs.
Impact of Probability-Based Approaches
When investigators provide numerical probability informa-
tion, they rely on the premise that people will respond to a given 
probability in a consistent manner. Th at is, a 10% risk should be 
interpreted as a 10% risk, regardless of whether it is presented as 
a percentage or an odds ratio or whether it is presented numeri-
cally or pictorially. Unfortunately, empirical tests of probabil-
ity-based communications have typically failed to support this 
premise [e.g., (31,32)]. People have diffi  culty recalling probabil-
ity information accurately [e.g., (33,34)], they make errors when 
asked to transform percentages into proportions or vice versa 
(e.g., Lipkus I: unpublished data [numeracy survey], 1998), and 
they confuse information about the frequency of a event with its 
rate of occurrence [e.g., (35)]. Th us, it would appear that peo-
ple cannot reliably understand and interpret numerical probabil-
ity statistics.
In fact, there is direct evidence that people do not appreciate 
some of the fundamental assumptions underlying probabilities. 
For example. Black et al. (36) reported that a substantial number 
of women estimated that their risk of developing breast cancer was 
less than their risk of developing and dying from it. People also 
have diffi  culty understanding and estimating cumulative risks as-
sociated with repeated patterns of behavior [e.g., contra ception use 
(37,38)]. More broadly, Schwartz et al. (39) assessed people’s fa-
miliarity with basic probability and numerical con cepts (i.e., nu-
meracy). Th ey found not only that people’s under standing of these 
mathematical concepts was quite poor, but also that their ability to 
accurately interpret numerical information regarding breast cancer 
and mammography was systematically dependent on their level of 
numeracy.
People’s beliefs are also sensitive to the specifi c numbers used 
to illustrate a risk. For example, people may be more con cerned 
about a potential health problem when they are told that a pat-
tern of behavior will increase their risk of dying by 30% than if 
they are told that it will change their risk of dying from one in 
10000 to 1.3 in 10000 (11).1 Several studies have shown that peo-
ple respond diff erentially to a ratio when it is expressed as 1:10 
versus 10:100 and that this occurs even when they understand 
that the two ratios illustrate the same probability (40,41). More-
over, Yamagishi (42) found that people rated a health problem 
as riskier when they were informed that it kills 1286 of 10000 
people (12.86%) compared with 24.14 of 100 people (24.14%). 
It would appear that people fail to consider the relevant sample 
size when processing information regarding the number of peo-
ple who have developed or died from a health problem [but see 
(31)].
In addition to the diffi  culties people have with the mathemati-
cal properties of probabilities, investigators must grapple with 
the fact that people fi nd it diffi  cult to ascribe meaning to a giv-
en level of risk. What does it mean to be told that you have a 1 
% chance of having a disabled child or that your risk of dying 
from cancer has increased from one in 10000 to 1.3 in 10000? 
Al though these statistics may be extremely precise, people’s re-
sponses to this information are anything but precise. When pro-
vided with numerical estimates, people appear to spontaneous-
ly transform the probability information into discrete categories 
[e.g., high or low risk (43,44)]. To the extent that people make 
decisions based on the belief that their risk is either high or low, 
the specifi c numerical probabilities they provide may not be par-
ticularly reliable or informative. Consistent with this analy sis, 
Windschitl and Wells (45) found that people’s numerical proba-
bility estimates failed to predict their preferences and be havioral 
intentions, whereas the verbal labels they used to de scribe the 
likelihood of an outcome consistently predicted the same set of 
decisions.
Because people have diffi  culty ascribing meaning to a prob-
ability estimate, they are acutely sensitive to available compari son 
information. In fact, when asked what information would help 
them understand a health risk, individuals typically request com-
parisons between the probability of diff erent risks (46). Evi dence 
that people readily construe risks in a comparative frame comes 
from studies that have manipulated the comparison in formation 
provided. Klein (47) has shown that people’s aff ective reactions 
to information about their risk depend on how their level of per-
sonal risk compares with the average risk, indepen dent of their 
absolute level of personal risk. Studies that have presented risks 
along a continuum have shown that people’s interpretation of the 
same numerical probability depended on whether it was placed 
at the high end or the low end of the continuum (26). People’s 
interpretation of the implications of their behavior is similarly 
aff ected by whether a response format leads them to believe that 
the frequency of their behavior is above or below the perceived 
norm (Rothman AJ, Haddock G, Schwarz N: manuscript sub-
mitted for publication). Of course, the manner in which risk in-
formation is presented is but one source of information that can 
aff ect how people interpret or use a given probability. Research 
has shown that people’s knowl edge, personality, and goals can 
also infl uence their interpreta tion of what a particular risk means 
[e.g., (48-50)].
Th e primary appeal of health risk communications that pre-
sent numerical probability information is that they off er people 
precise information regarding the probability that a health prob-
lem will occur. However, the eff ectiveness of this communica tion 
approach is constrained by people’s inability to accurately inter-
pret and use numerical probabilities. In fact, the very strat egies 
that people employ to render probability information more use-
ful strip it of the very precision that this intervention ap proach 
off ers.
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Impact of Contextualized Approaches
In light of the limitations of a probability-based approach to 
communicating risk information, we now consider an alternative 
method that provides people with information to assist them in 
understanding the personal implications of a given health risk. Re-
call that, although risk is typically defi ned as the numerical prob-
ability of a given event occurring, lay conceptions of risk are based 
on a much richer set of cognitive and aff ective beliefs. When a 
health problem is being considered, information about the numer-
ical probability of a risk is viewed as insuffi  cient;
people are interested in information about what causes a health 
problem, about the severity of its consequences, and about what 
can be done to either prevent or treat the problem (51,52). Th is 
information is considered valuable because it enables people to 
develop a mental model that delineates the personal relevance of 
a given risk—what might cause one to develop a health problem 
and the potential costs of developing that problem.
Antecedents. Interventions that heighten the salience of fac-
tors that place people at risk for adverse outcomes have typically 
involved directing their attention to relevant aspects of their be-
havior or personal attributes. For instance, Gerrard et al. (53) had 
female Marines review their sexual and contraceptive his tories pri-
or to assessing their risks for pregnancy and human immunode-
fi ciency virus (HIV) infection. Th is behavioral review heightened 
judgments of personal risk for HIV infection and, in some cas-
es, personal risk for pregnancy. Other interventions have provided 
individuals with personalized information about the link between 
a health problem and specifi c behavioral or personal characteris-
tics. Th is strategy has been somewhat suc cessful in rendering both 
optimistic and pessimistic misperceptions about comparative risk 
more accurate (16), although other investigators (54) have found 
that directing people’s attention toward potential risk factors failed 
to reduce optimistic percep tions of comparative risk.
Some investigators have emphasized the need to diff erentiate 
between the absolute amount of risk-relevant information peo-
ple can bring to mind and the relative ease with which that infor-
mation is recalled. Traditionally, interventions have assumed that 
the more risk-increasing factors people bring to mind, the more at 
risk they will feel. However, the experienced ease with which in-
formation comes to mind has also been shown to sys tematically 
aff ect judgment [e.g., (55)}. Specifi cally, people who have easily 
brought a few risk-increasing factors to mind may infer a greater 
degree of personal risk than do people who had diffi  culty bring-
ing to mind a larger number of risk factors. Both Rothman and 
Schwarz (15) and Raghubir and Menon (56) have successful-
ly used this approach to heighten perceptions of per sonal risk, al-
though only Raghubir and Menon obtained a re duction in partici-
pants’ optimistic perceptions of comparative risk.2 Perceptions of 
personal risk are also sensitive to the rela tive ease or diffi  culty with 
which risk-decreasing factors come to mind. In this case, having 
had diffi  culty generating a large num ber of risk-decreasing factors 
can lead to increased perceptions of personal risk (15).
Consequences. Investigators have developed two diff erent 
strategies to increase the salience of outcomes associated with a 
given health problem. In each case, the goal of the intervention 
has been to increase the personal relevance of the risk by help-
ing people to recognize that the health problem could happen 
to them. Sherman et al. (57) provided people with a set of symp-
toms that were either easy or diffi  cult to bring to mind and ob-
served that the ease with which people could imagine them selves 
experiencing the symptoms of a disease heightened their percep-
tions of personal vulnerability. More recently, interven tions have 
tried to emphasize the personal relevance of a health problem 
by highlighting the similarities between members of the target-
ed audience and people who have had personal experience with a 
health problem. For example, the presentation of personal testi-
monials by HIV-positive individuals has led to increased percep-
tions of personal risk—but only when people perceived them-
selves to be similar to the person providing the testimony [e.g., 
(27,28); see also (58)]. In fact, Gump and Kulik (28) have dem-
onstrated that the level of personal risk people will recog nize de-
pends on the degree to which they are able to see them selves as 
diff erent from the infected person.
A second approach to highlighting the outcomes associated 
with a given risk has involved messages that graphically illus trate 
the severity of the consequences associated with a health problem 
[(8,18); see Salovey et al. (1) for a recent review]. For example, Sut-
ton and Hallett (30) successfully raised perceptions of personal 
risk related to seat belt use by showing people graphic scenes of car 
crashes and mortuaries. Similar eff ects have been found for images 
that depict outcomes related to cigarette smoking [e.g., (29,59)]. 
Although there is no empirical support for the premise that the 
disturbing nature of these ap peals would lead people to minimize 
the personal relevance of a given health threat, people must know 
how they can respond to the health threat if a fear appeal is going 
to elicit a change in behavior (18,60).
Given the fi ndings obtained across a range of experimental 
paradigms, it would appear that interventions that render either 
the antecedents or the consequences of a health problem salient 
can have a meaningful eff ect on perceptions of personal risk. Al-
though people may be responsive to information about what could 
happen to them and how it might occur, the specifi c pro cesses by 
which this information aff ects risk beliefs have yet to be well spec-
ifi ed. We consider this issue as well as potential limitations to this 
communication strategy in the following sec tion.
What Have We Learned and What Do We Still 
Need to Know?
On the basis of the empirical research covered in our review, 
we believe that several conclusions can be drawn regarding the 
communication of health risk information. First, people do not 
respond in a consistent manner to communication strategies that 
rely solely on the presentation of numerical risk information. From 
the perspective of an expert, the precision aff orded by a numeri-
cal probability estimate may be appealing, but its infl u ence on lay 
people’s beliefs and behavior is anything but precise. Any system-
atic impact that this information might have on de cision making 
and behavior is undermined by people’s inability to understand 
the meaning of a specifi c probability and their resulting compu-
tational errors. In an attempt to ascribe meaning to a given risk, 
people’s inferences are strongly aff ected by information that is ac-
cessible at the time of judgment. Th us, there is considerable vari-
ability in how people respond to prob ability-based risk messag-
es.3 Interventions that provide people with information about the 
causes or consequences of a particu lar health problem appear to 
have a more consistent infl uence on perceptions of personal risk 
precisely because they systemati cally control the information peo-
ple have available when drawing inferences about their personal
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risk. Moreover, the observa tion that contextually based approaches 
to providing risk information are more eff ective is consistent with 
the broader fi nding that people are more likely to base their judg-
ment on concrete, case-based information than on abstract, statis-
tical in formation [e.g., (63,64)].
Recognizing the Limitations of a Contextually Based 
Communication Strategy
Although interventions that have utilized a contextually based 
approach to communicating risk information have had some suc-
cess aff ecting perceptions of personal risk, investigators can not as-
sume that people will always respond appropriately to the health 
information provided. Because people want to maintain a favor-
able impression of their health status, they may, if possible, selec-
tively attend to information about their health. For example, when 
asked to consider how their own risk for a health problem com-
pares with that of the average person, people selectively bring to 
mind health practices that make them look good (65). In a sim-
ilar manner, people have a better memory for behavioral guide-
lines that place their behavior in a favorable (healthy) light than 
for those that place it in an unfavorable (unhealthy) light (66). Fi-
nally, when asked to consider their own behavioral prac tices, peo-
ple may selectively focus on the preventive actions that they have 
adopted rather than on the risks that they have taken [(53,67); 
for a complete discussion of these fi ndings, see Gerrard et al., this 
monograph].
Even when people do attend to information about potential 
health risks, they may search for fl aws in the message or adopt 
higher standards for evaluating the quality of the information 
(6,8,68). In situations where risk information cannot be refuted 
directly, people may adjust other beliefs in an attempt to coun-
ter the undesirable implications of the risk message (7,69,70). 
For example, Gerrard et al. (7) observed that, even though young 
adults increased their perceptions of risk in response to an in crease 
in their risk behaviors, they also increased their assess ment of the 
prevalence of these behaviors (thereby normalizing the practice) 
and decided that the health implications of these behaviors were 
less relevant to future behavioral decisions.
However, the importance of people’s attempts to minimize 
the implications of the risk information is unclear. Several stud ies 
have observed that, even when people act to minimize a health 
threat, they remain interested in information about how to address 
the problem [e.g., (71-73)]. For example, people who learned that 
they had borderline high cholesterol perceived high cholesterol to 
be a less serious health problem than did those who were told that 
they had low cholesterol, but they still ex pressed greater interest 
in taking steps to lower their cholesterol (72). Th ere is even evi-
dence that interventions can prompt changes in behavioral inten-
tions independent of observed changes in risk perceptions. Gump 
and Kulik (28) found that the HIV status of a man describing his 
experiences infl uenced in tentions to be HIV tested independent 
of changes in perceptions of personal risk. Similarly, Evers et al. 
(27) found that hetero sexuals reported stronger intentions to be 
HIV tested regardless of the sexual orientation of an HIV-positive 
speaker, whereas they changed their perceptions of personal risk 
only after having listened to a heterosexual speaker.
Th e observed dissociation between people’s risk beliefs and 
their behavioral intentions should not be interpreted as a sign that 
changes in people’s behavior can be elicited in the absence of in-
formation about health risks. Information about a potential health 
risk may be necessary to initiate the self-regulatory pro cesses that 
underlie an appropriate behavioral response. How ever, people may 
independently regulate their aff ective and be havioral responses 
to a health threat, as suggested by Leventhal’s Parallel Response 
Model (12,18). Specifi cally, people may choose to respond both in 
ways that alleviate their distress about a potential health problem 
(thereby attenuating any change in perceived risk) and in ways that 
serve to reduce the likelihood that they might develop the health 
problem (thereby eliciting changes in behavior). It is precisely be-
cause people may respond to health risk information in myri-
ad ways that investigators who test interventions must attend not 
only to changes in people’s perceptions of the chance of a health 
risk occurring, but also to changes in people’s beliefs about the im-
plications of that risk and how they intend to respond to that risk. 
In the absence of an assessment of these ancillary beliefs, it may be 
diffi  cult to draw conclusions regarding the practical signifi  cance of 
any observed change (or lack thereof ) in perceived risk.
Moving Beyond the Perceived Magnitude of One’s Risk
At present, health risk interventions are primarily evaluated on 
the basis of their ability to infl uence perceptions of risk. Although 
the possibility that behavioral intentions will change independent 
of any change in perceived risk indicates that in vestigators need to 
employ a broad array of indicators when evaluating an interven-
tion, consideration should also be given to the specifi c manner in 
which changes in perceived risk are as sessed. In fact, the apparent 
dissociation between risk beliefs and behavioral intentions may re-
fl ect, in part, the ways that investi gators have operationalized per-
ceived risk. Almost all measures of risk perception have been de-
signed to detect changes in the perceived likelihood of a person’s 
risk. However, what if an intervention is eff ective not because it 
leads people to believe something is more likely to happen but in-
stead because it causes them to be more concerned about a given 
risk? For example, a person might still report a 1 % risk of devel-
oping a health prob lem but be considerably more concerned about 
that level of risk. Current measures of risk perceptions are not able 
to detect changes in the meaning people ascribe to a specifi c lev-
el of risk. Th e inclusion of measures of worry and concern about a 
health risk might help address this problem. In fact, McCaul et al. 
(74) have found that how worried a woman was about developing 
breast cancer predicted mammography screening utilization even 
after controlling for her perception of personal risk. It might also 
be useful to assess whether an intervention has altered the salience 
or accessibility of a person’s risk perceptions. In terventions might 
prove to be eff ective not because they increase people’s perceptions 
of risk but because they increase the prob ability that beliefs about 
personal risk will come to mind when people are faced with a be-
havioral decision.
Toward a Model of Health Risk Communication
Despite the fact that investigators have assessed the merits of a 
range of risk communication strategies, our limited under standing 
of how diff erent aspects of a health risk message aff ect people’s be-
liefs and behaviors constrains any recommendations that can be 
formulated. Th e observation that information regard ing both the 
antecedents and consequences of a health problem can reliably af-
fect people’s risk beliefs may off er a base on which a conceptu-
al model of risk communication can be built. Information about
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the antecedents and consequences of a health problem is believed 
to be eff ective because it enables people to imagine that “it could 
happen to them” (13,14). Information about the consequences of 
a health problem helps people to recognize what could happen 
to them, whereas information about the antecedents of a health 
problem helps people to un derstand how it could happen. Be-
cause people rely on these two dimensions (i.e., cause and con-
sequences) to structure their men tal models of health problems 
(12), information about the ante cedents and consequences of a 
health problem has considerable informational value and can be 
readily utilized.
When people receive information about the consequences of a 
health problem, the implications of a potential health risk are ren-
dered vivid and concrete. Although people may more readily rec-
ognize the severity of a potential health problem and may even be 
motivated to take precautionary action, imagining what it would 
be like to have a health problem does not provide people with suf-
fi cient information about how to address the potential problem. 
In the absence of information about how to eff ectively deal with a 
health problem, information about con sequences may elicit great-
er feelings of personal risk and con cern but, at the same time, may 
cause people to feel less confi  dent about their ability to deal with 
a potential health threat. Because people need to know what they 
want to avoid and how they can go about minimizing their risk, 
merely drawing peo ple’s attention to the undesired consequenc-
es of a health prob lem is not likely to be an eff ective way to elicit 
risk-reducing behavior (18,75).
Information about the antecedents of a health problem directs 
people’s attention toward the factors that determine whether or 
not the problem will develop. Because antecedent information in-
forms people about the specifi c factors that cause one’s risk to in-
crease, it can simultaneously provide them with information about 
what, if anything, they can do to minimize their risk. Th us, ante-
cedent-based risk interventions off er the possibility of in creasing 
not only people’s perceptions of personal risk but also their con-
fi dence that they can cope with a potential health threat (18,75). 
However, in and of itself, information about what causes a health 
problem to develop provides people with little information regard-
ing the severity of the potential problem. People may learn how to 
minimize their risk, but in the absence of information about the 
severity of the problem they may not be suffi  ciently motivated to 
take action. Given that information about the consequences of a 
health problem provides people with a clear reason for taking ac-
tion, the integration of informa tion about the antecedents and the 
consequences of a health problem may prove to be an eff ective 
way to maximize the impact of a health risk intervention. Stud-
ies are needed that systematically examine the eff ect that the pro-
posed integrative framework has on people’s aff ective and behav-
ioral responses to a health risk communication, with specifi c at-
tention paid to the factors that are thought to mediate the impact 
of each type of information.
Th e development of a more precise understanding of how 
people respond to a health risk message should also help inves-
tigators anticipate a priori what factors are likely to moderate 
the message’s impact. Given the heterogeneity of the health 
risks people must deal with, it is unlikely that a single interven-
tion approach will prove eff ective for all health problems. Only 
with the formulation of a conceptual model of risk communica-
tion will we be in a position to predict whether an eff ective inter-
vention strategy can be transferred successfully from one health 
domain to another. In a similar manner, even though studies 
have revealed that individual diff erences in personality and in 
prior experience can infl uence how people process health risk 
information [e.g, (15,49)}, the extent to which these moderating 
factors generalize across health domains or interact with oth-
er aspects of the intervention strategy is not yet known (but see 
Gerrard et al., this monograph).
Can the Informational Value of Probability Information Be 
Increased?
Contextually based interventions have proven capable of in-
fl uencing perceptions of risk, but these methodologies lack the pre-
cision aff orded by a numerical estimate of the probability that an 
event will occur. Could an intervention integrate the presen tation 
of probability information with information about the causes and 
consequences of a health problem? Th is approach would off er peo-
ple precise information about the magnitude of their risk, but it 
would do so in a context that clarifi es the implications of this in-
formation for their health. However, any intervention strategy that 
depends on the precision aff orded by numerical probability infor-
mation must confront the diffi  culties people have when forced to 
use this information (39). If inter ventions are going to rely on peo-
ple’s ability to use probability information, then investigators need 
to provide them with the skills required to use the information ac-
curately and appropri ately. People need to know not only how to 
interpret numerical information about a specifi c health risk, but 
also how to gauge the degree to which adopting a particular pre-
cautionary behavior will aff ect these probabilities. Although there 
is considerable evidence that people can be taught to use basic sta-
tistical prin ciples [e.g., (76,77)], the feasibility of integrating basic 
lessons in numeracy into interventions that provide people with 
health risk information remains untested.
Final Th oughts
If we expect people to make informed decisions about their 
health, information must be communicated to them in a manner 
that they can understand and use. Although scientifi c advances 
continue to provide increasingly more precise information about 
the health risks that people face, there has been little consensus 
as to the most eff ective way to communicate this information. On 
the basis of our review of the literature, we believe that interven-
tion approaches that help people understand how a health prob-
lem could develop (i.e., its antecedents) and recog nize what could 
happen to them (i.e., its consequences) off er the most eff ective way 
to communicate health risk information. However, the strength of 
this assessment is tempered by the absence of studies that have 
systematically compared the merits of diff erent intervention ap-
proaches. A new generation of inter vention studies is needed that 
will allow investigators to assess directly the relative impact of dif-
ferent risk communication strategies. However, the identifi cation 
of eff ective communica tion strategies is not suffi  cient. Investiga-
tors need to determine not only what strategies are eff ective but 
also why they are eff ective. Substantial progress in our ability to 
transfer success ful interventions across both diff erent health do-
mains and diff erent participant populations will come only after 
we have de veloped a more precise understanding of how people 
process and utilize health risk information. 
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Notes
1 Although this observation is frequently cited, no direct test of this 
claim could be identifi ed. However, Halpern et al. (31) have found 
that people per ceived oral contraceptives to pose a greater health risk 
when the information was presented as a relative risk (e.g., 415% 
greater risk of dying) than when it was presented as a base rate (e.g., 
one in 12,000 die).
2 Although people primarily rely on the ease with which infor-
mation comes to mind, they will base their judgment on the specifi c 
content of the recalled information when they are motivated to pro-
cess the information in a more systematic and detailed manner (15) 
or when their subjective experience has been rendered nondiagnos-
tic (55).
30f course, confl icting interpretations of information are not limited 
to nu merical presentations of information. Several investigators have 
found there to be considerable variability in the values that people as-
sign to quantitative labels such as frequently, sometimes, or occasion-
ally [e.g., (61,62)].
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